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Abstract
We explain persistent differences in cultural traits of immigrant groups with the
presence of community leaders. Leaders influence the cultural traits of their commu-
nity, which have an impact on the group’s earnings. They determine whether a com-
munity will be more assimilated and wealthier or less assimilated and poorer. With a
leader cultural integration remains incomplete. The leader chooses more distinctive cul-
tural traits in high productivity environments and if the community is more connected.
Lump sum transfers to immigrants can hinder cultural integration. These findings are
in line with integration patterns of various ethnic and religious groups.
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1 INTRODUCTION
It has been established since the 1960s that cultural integration is not a natural, inevitable
process but that it regularly fails along religious lines (Herberg (1983), Mayer (1979)) as
well as ethnic dimensions (Glazer and Moynihan (1963)). Nevertheless, cultural integration
seems to be an important goal in many countries, such as the Netherlands, the US, France
and Germany (Brubaker (2001), Schalk-Soekar et al. (2004)) who all pursue assimilationist
policies. This raises the question of how immigrants adapt. When does cultural integration
fail? Why does it often fail along religious and ethnic lines?
We address these questions and show how cultural and economic differences between
immigrant communities and their host country persist in the long run, despite exposure to
the culture of the host country and economic gains from assimilation.1 We offer a novel
explanation for this phenomenon, namely, community leaders who influence the identity
of their community and thus act as identity entrepreneurs. Our notion of identity follows
(Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010)) in that it denotes a sense of self. In the immigration con-
text a higher identity corresponds to stronger identification with the culture of origin. This
in turn implies that lower identity indicates greater assimilation. We show in a dynamic
model of assimilation how leaders who benefit from a community that identifies with its
origin culture prevent complete integration of immigrants.
Community leaders are common in immigrant groups. Despite this, the notion of a
leader who creates a cultural identity is new to economics. We therefore shed some light on
the leaders we consider, on who they are and in particular on their preferences. We show
that they care both about the identity and the economic well-being of their community. Last,
we present evidence that leaders are in fact able to influence the identity of their community.
We first turn to immigrant churches as they frequently fill the role of community lead-
ers. As an illustrative example, we argue that in Turkish communities in Germany the
leadership role falls to Imams and in particular the “DITIB”, an institution of the Turkish
government. The DITIB employs the majority of Imams (Yasar (2012)) and can thus be seen
as the ultimate leader. This institution follows a Turkish tradition of influencing cultural
traits through Imams. Their impact was first recognized by Atatürk who harnessed them
for his own political goals. He initially used Imams to mobilize the Turkish people in the
1As an example, gains from assimilation are higher earnings if an immigrant conforms to the norms preva-
lent in the host country, which in turn enables him to be more successful in the native labor market, see Kantare-
vic (2004).
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Turkish War of Independence and later to shape the beliefs of the Turkish people, in par-
ticular emphasizing that a state-conform and moderate Islam was taught, often against the
wishes of the Imams themselves. Atatürk achieved this by creating an organization that
employed Imams directly and that ultimately led to the change he had aimed for (Ceylan
(2010)).
Imams influenced the norms and values of their communities in historic Turkey, and
they continue to do so in their communities in modern Germany: through their sermons
and teachings they affect the assimilation of Turkish immigrants. According to Ceylan
(2010, p.17), the political and religious orientation and the attitude of Imams towards the
German government decide whether Muslims will be integrated in German society.2
Thus, it seems clear that Imams seek to spread their norms and values and therefore gain
from a community that follows their teachings. At the same time, they also value monetary
contributions from their community (Ceylan (2010, p.61)). Any religious movement seeks
donations and encourages their members to contribute. It is well established that wealthier
individuals donate more to their congregation, for an overview see Bekkers and Wiepking
(2010). Thus, the Imams do not only care about the identity, but also the financial situation
of their community.
Not only Imams (or for that matter Rabbis or Priests) can be considered to be leaders;
foreign language media fill this role, too. For example, in Hispanic communities in the
US, Spanish-language media often determine communication in the community and thus
have an influence on the attitude towards integration (Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993)).3
Like religious leaders, who are interested in the observance of religious cultural norms,
foreign-language media have an interest in preserving language skills and the identity that
comes with it and might even have incentives to discourage language acquisition as in-
creased fluency in the host country language leads consumers to switch to host country
media outlets (see Subervi-Velez (1986) for the Spanish-language media). Foreign-language
media are businesses that are interested in maximizing their profits by having a large au-
2To be more precise about what features of norms and values Imams influence we consider the impact
of being part of a Muslim community on the attitude to female labor force participation. Generally, those
who identify with being Muslim, have a more traditional attitude towards female labor force participation,
which in turn affects actual female labor force participation. Fortin (2005) shows that perceptions of women
as homemakers are closely associated with women’s labor market outcomes. Views that see men as the main
breadwinners and women as homemakers are strongly influenced by religious ideology (Algan and Cahuc
(2006); Guiso et al. (2003)). For example, Imams in Oslo emphasize that Islam does not forbid women to work
in the public sphere, but that if women were to take outside jobs it should be in education or medical care
(Predelli (2004)).
3Chinese-language media have the same role in Chinese communities (Zhou and Cai (2002)).
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dience. They can achieve this by discouraging cultural integration, which prevents their
consumers switching to the media of the host country. Additionally, they benefit from a
wealthier community that can afford, for example, the newspapers produced or that is a
more attractive target to advertisers.
What these examples highlight is that leaders benefit from their community and there-
fore have an interest in preserving a distinct group identity. They maintain such an identity
by setting distinct norms and values that then influence the community’s group members.
Both religious leaders and foreign-language media care about the group members’ norms
as well as the economic well-being of their community.
We bring out the importance of community leaders in preventing cultural integration
by first considering a group of immigrants where no leader is present. In this case the com-
munity will fully assimilate to the host country. We show this in a model of assimilation in
discrete time. In each period, immigrants first decide how much to invest in host country
specific skills (e.g. language skills and familiarity with norms and customs) which increase
earnings as they improve the chances of immigrants in the host country labor market, tak-
ing their identity as given. A higher level of identity corresponding to a greater affinity
with the country of origin makes it more costly to invest in skills and thus individuals with
stronger identities invest less in skills.
In a second step, an immigrant’s identity changes due to skill investment.4 Our notion
of identity resembles the concept of a cultural trait. Therefore, we model the changes in
identity, or rather in cultural traits, following the literature on continuous culture trait for-
mation, a literature that goes back to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973).5 In our setting,
continuous traits are transmitted through a network.6 This implies that an individual’s
identity is the weighted average of the host society’s culture, his own past identity as well
as the identity of the rest of the community, his network.
Departing from existing work on continuous cultural trait formation, skill investment
affects the relative weight an individual puts on these sources and thus the weights change
in each period. Higher skill levels imply a greater exposure to the host society which is
reflected in the group member assigning a higher weight to the host society’s culture. As
4The identity dynamics provide a departure from Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2010), where identity remains
fixed.
5Another key paper dealing with cultural trait formation is Bisin and Verdier (2000) who restrict attention
to discrete cultural traits.
6Earlier work on continuous cultural trait formation in networks are Büchel et al. (2014) and Panebianco
(2014).
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a result, an immigrant with high skill levels will tend to identify less with the norms and
values of his origin and more with those of the host country. In the subsequent period,
this decrease in identity makes additional investment in skills less costly. An immigrant’s
assimilation process thus displays a positive feedback loop: investment in skills reduces
identity, which in turn, decreases the cost of investment, leading to higher investment in
skills etc. As we show, in the long run, the immigrant group will be fully assimilated with
the host country.
This result changes drastically when a community leader with a fixed identity is present.
Then, assimilation will remain incomplete. In the presence of a leader, an immigrant’s new
identity is now also shaped by the identity set by the leader, in addition to the influence
of the host society and that of the group members. Then, even though the group member
invests in skill, his identity cannot converge to that of the host society as long as the leader
has some influence on him. In particular, the long run identity of the group member lies
strictly between that of the host society and that of the leader.
But which identity does the leader set? We characterize the economic and social environ-
ments in which the leader chooses full assimilation, intermediate assimilation or extremism.
For the case of intermediate cultural integration, we also ask how different policy measures
can affect the level of cultural distinction. Our results reverse what we find without the
presence of a leader.
We first analyze the effect of an increase in the productivity in the environment. Greater
productivity means that a given level of skill investment leads to greater economic returns
holding all else equal. We find that if assimilation is intermediate, then being in a higher
productivity environment induces the leader to set a higher level of cultural distinction.
Higher productivity makes it easier to attain income and changes the trade-off between
earnings and identity. This results in the leader countering the increase in productivity by
setting a higher identity. Ultimately, in a high productivity environment, group members
will have a higher identity, but will also be wealthier. Therefore, in this environment, im-
migrants have a higher welfare, with welfare depending on identity as well as earnings.
We can reinterpret this result as an insight on the level of discrimination in a society: a
policy that reduces discrimination allows immigrants to access greater economic returns for
a given level of skills investment and thus is equivalent to higher productivity for the immi-
grant groups. According to our model, such a decrease in discrimination will increase the
community’s welfare but will not lead to more cultural integration; in fact, it will reduce it.
4
Further, we consider the effect of an economic support policy in the form of a lump sum
transfer to immigrants on their assimilation outcomes. We find that in the presence of a
leader a transfer can lead to less assimilation and less investment in host country specific
skills. This highlights that economic wellbeing will not automatically lead to more cultural
integration, a finding that is in line with Krueger (2008).
Last, we study the effect of community structure on assimilation. Group members in-
fluence each other and the extent to which they do so, that is, how much weight they assign
to each other, also impacts the level of cultural distinction chosen by the leader. Specifically,
the leader sets a higher level of identity when group members have a greater influence
on each other. We interpret these type of groups as communities where individuals have
strong ties, where individuals influence each other strongly. We offer thus a novel explana-
tion of why groups with stronger ties assimilate less: namely, not only due to the ties per
se, but also because they result in incentives for a leader to set a more distinct identity.
Our model can help to understand the assimilation patterns of different groups through-
out history. We consider first the case of Jewish communities that assimilated fully in Ger-
many after they were granted full citizen rights, but chose more cultural distinction in Hun-
gary. This development can be attributed to Rabbis, who as the community leaders, faced
different economic environments in these two countries. In particular, Germany was al-
ready industrialized at the time, whereas Hungary was still mainly agrarian. This lead
them to choose different paths for their respective communities as assimilation in Germany
was more attractive as it increased earnings dramatically, whereas in a agrarian Hungary
earnings would only have increased moderately.7
Second, we look at Muslim assimilation, which has been argued to be different from
that of other ethnic and religious groups.8 We show that possible rationales for such differ-
ences might be the greater influence of Imams relative to other religious leaders, a higher
interest in cultural norms relative to economic success and strong bonds amongst family
and community members.
Related Literature Our paper contributes to the literature that aims to understand different
assimilation patterns of immigrant groups. Common explanations in the literature are par-
ents’ preferences for cultural traits (Bisin and Verdier (2000)),9 ethnic and cultural distance
7For an overview of the Jewish assimilation, see Carvalho and Koyama (2011).
8For an overview, see Bisin et al. (2008), Constant et al. (2006), and Haug (2008).
9Fernández et al. (2004) and Fernández and Fogli (2006) also show that cultural traits are shaped by parents.
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to the host country (Alba and Nee (1997); Bisin et al. (2008)), previous educational back-
ground (Borjas (1985)) and discrimination against immigrants (Alba and Nee (1997)). We
see our approach highlighting the role of group leaders as complementary to these expla-
nations.
Methodologically, our paper is most closely related to the transmission of continuous
cultural traits and builds on Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1973). Recent papers based on
this approach include Büchel et al. (2014), Panebianco (2014) and Vaughan (2013). In these
papers, the transmission of cultural traits occurs through parental choice, that is parents
have a preference for their children to have the same cultural trait and therefore socialize
them accordingly. In our setting, agents start out with given cultural traits and they choose
to culturally integrate into the host society due to economic incentives. Agents shed their
cultural traits to some extent as this increases their earnings in the host country labor mar-
ket. Another key feature of all these papers is that with continuous cultural traits there
is full assimilation in the long run unless there are persistent ties to the home country or
subgroups are closed. In a different setting, Kuran and Sandholm (2008) also obtain full
assimilation. Departing from this convergence result by taking into account the presence
of a leader helps explain non-assimilation and differences in the assimilation processes of
different immigrant groups (Bisin and Verdier (2010)).
The technical contribution of our paper derives from the feedback loop between skill
investment and identity formation in our model. This interaction implies that the updating
matrix describing the evolution of identity from one period to the next is time varying.
We show that an intuitive sufficient condition on the relationship between the identities
and changes in the updating matrix ensures convergence to a unique steady state. Our
approach allows for all patterns of social interaction and does not require assumptions on
the properties of the time-varying matrices, as has been the approach in the literature thus
far (Büchel et al. (2014), Panebianco (2014)).10
Furthermore, our paper is the first in the cultural transmission literature that studies the
strategic incentives of a leader in the choice of identity.11 The importance of community
leaders has also been documented in Carvalho and Koyama (2011). The key difference to
their work is that our model allows for different types of leaders, whereas they only look
10DeMarzo et al. (2003) allow for some variation in the weight agents assign to their own identity, but ulti-
mately they show that their specific setup has the same long run behavior as a model with a fixed updating
matrix.
11Other work on opinion dynamics includes Acemoglu et al. (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2013), Büchel et al.
(2015), and Lorenz (2006).
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at religious leaders, namely at Rabbis in Jewish communities. We generalize their payoff
function and we explicitly model the assimilation process and take group structures into
account. Further, Hauk and Mueller (2015) discuss the role of cultural leaders in the clash
of cultures. In their setting the leader is not crucial for the clash, contrary to our finding.
Additionally, our model adds considerations regarding group structure and the impact of
policies on the strategy of the leader.12 Within the area of cultural transmission, subsequent
work by Verdier and Zenou (2015) introduces a second strategic cultural leader and studies
the resulting contest between leaders. Their analysis differs from ours by adopting a Bisin
and Verdier (2000) framework with discrete cultural traits, whereas in our model cultural
traits are continuous. In addition, their framework does not allow for heterogeneity in
the cultural integration of individuals, skill investment or an explicit network structure.
Despite these differences, Verdier and Zenou (2015) confirm that the presence of leaders
can prevent full integration, underlining the robustness of our finding.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We present the model of the assimila-
tion process in Section 2 and our analysis in Section 3. We first analyze assimilation without
the presence of a leader as a benchmark in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 then shows how a leader
can prevent integration. In Section 4, we allow the leader to be strategic and study implica-
tions for assimilation outcomes. Comparative statics and policy implications are discussed
in Section 5. Section 6 connects our findings to a number of applications. Section 7 con-
cludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix, supplementary material and details of
some proofs can be found in the Online Appendix.
2 A MODEL OF COMMUNITY ASSIMILATION
In our model there are n group members which are influenced by the host society S and the
group’s leader L. The host society does not take any action in our model; only the group
members and the group leader are active players.
The model is dynamic and set in discrete time. Group members are characterized at any
time t by their level of skills Hti ∈ R+0 and their identity pti ∈ [0, pmax]. The identity measure
captures the attachment an individual has with his group, with higher pti indicating higher
levels of group attachment and greater differentiation from the host society. We bound
12Empirically, Munshi and Wilson (2008) have also emphasized the importance of churches in the preserva-
tion of cultural traits.
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the space of permissible identities and assume that there is an upper level pmax.13 We fix
ptS = pS = 0 for the host society for all time periods.
14 In what follows we focus on long run
outcomes in which the leader sets the optimal identity, pL ∈ [0, pmax], for the steady state.15
A group member i is fully identified with the host country if pti = 0, whereas p
t
i = pL
indicates full identification with the group leader. Group members invest in skills Hi and
adapt their identity over time taking as given the leader’s identity. We first consider the
assimilation process of the group members for a given group leader identity pL and then
turn to the resulting incentives for the leader.
2.1 Group Member Assimilation
In every period t, each group member goes first through a process of identity adaptation
and in a second step invests in skills. We discuss each of these processes in turn.
Identity Dynamics Group members do not actively choose their identity; instead it is ad-
justed passively with reference to the social environment. This is in line with the standard
assumption in Akerlof and Kranton (2010) where identity is not a choice variable, but rather
a preference or type.16 A group member’s identity is composed as a weighted average of
the values and norms of (i) the host society, (ii) the leader and (iii) the past identity of the
group members themselves (including member i’s past identity). The weights on these
three sources of influence are determined as follows:
(i) Host Society Each group member is influenced by the host society, S. We denote the
share of influence given to that source by g(Ht−1i ) ∈ (0, 1) which is a strictly increasing
function of the previous period’s investment in skills, Ht−1i . This captures the fact that with
greater levels of investment, the group member is more exposed to the influence of the host
13The upper bound pmax can be seen as a restriction imposed by the host country. This upper bound can be
normalized but this does not present a significant simplification and thus we leave it free.
14We assume that the host society is not influenced by the immigrant group. As such our model focuses on
one side of the assimilation process. We consider this an innocuous assumption as in many settings immigrants
make up only a small percentage of the population. Immigrants might have a local effect, but will in most cases
not change a country’s culture. Furthermore, by keeping the overall identity of the host country fixed we are
able to specifically study the identity dynamics of interest, namely that of the immigrant group.
15One reason for this could be that the leader is infinitely patient and therefore only cares about long-run
outcomes. Note that this does not imply that it is never optimal for the leader to adjust identity. If there is
a change in the environment which leads to a different steady state, then the leader may find it beneficial to
adjust his position for this new environment. More precisely, we focus on the optimal steady state pL for a given
environment as the long run outcome and we do not investigate in detail the leader identity path approaching
the steady state. A recent follow-up paper that explores the dynamics of cultural leaders’ positioning over time
away from the steady state is Verdier and Zenou (2016).
16Bisin and Verdier (2001) argue that cultural traits are already formed very early in life (kindergarten), which
makes it plausible to take identity as given.
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society, for example through new social connections or greater exposure to the host country
media. It also implies that the weight on the host society changes over time.
(ii) Leader Of the residual, the leader captures a share λi ∈ (0, 1). The overall weight on
the leader is then given by λi(1 − g(Ht−1i )). The parameter λi is an indicator measuring
the influence of the leader on group member i, with higher λi indicating a more influential
leader.
(iii) Group Members The weight group member i assigns to group member j is denoted
by γij(1 − λi)(1 − g(Ht−1i )), where γij ∈ [0, 1] presents the relative within-group weight i
puts on j such that
∑n
j=1 γij = 1 ∀ i. The weights between group members represent the
strength of their social connections and they vary over time, depending on the level of skill
investment.
An overview of the process is provided in Figure 1. The identity adaptation process for
Total Influence
Host Society
g(Ht−1i )
Within Group
1− g(Ht−1i )
1− λiλi
Group Member NetworkGroup Leader
Figure 1: Influence Weights in Period t
group member i from pt−1i to p
t
i can then be summarized as follows,
pti =
[
1− g (Ht−1i )] ·
λipL + (1− λi)
n∑
j=1
γijp
t−1
j
 ,
where we have used the fact that pS = 0 so that the influence term of the host society van-
ishes. Note that the normalization of the host society’s identity to zero is without loss of
generality. We refer to the symmetric case as the setting with two group members who each
assign the same weight γ ∈ [0, 1] to themselves and (1− γ) on the other group member. In
this case, we refer to γ as group division as it is a measure of how divided the group is. By
the same logic (1− γ) is then a measure of group cohesion. Setting γ = 1 reflects the special
case of the group member being isolated from the influence of other group members and
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therefore maximal group division.
Skills Investment In a second step, group members invest in skillsHti ∈ R+0 . This measures
a group member’s effort to learn the language, to understand the norms and cultures of the
host society, which leads to higher income in the host country labor market.17
Each period the group members simultaneously select how much to invest in skills.
The payoff from skills Hti is given by αif
(
Hti
)
. The function f(Hti ) is strictly increasing
and concave in Hti . We also assume that it is continuous and three times continuously
differentiable. Additionally, payoffs from investment depend on the parameter αi ∈ (0, 1),
which reflects productivity.
Investing in skills is costly with the cost depending on the identity of the group member.
For ease of exposition we let this cost be linear in the investment level with marginal costs
c
(
pti
)
. We assume that marginal costs are strictly increasing in pti, c
′ (pti) > 0, capturing
the notion that immigrants who are more deeply rooted in their culture and whose norms
and values are more different from the host society face higher costs understanding and
accessing their new environment.
Finally, we assume that the marginal net return to additional investment at Hti = 0 is
positive for all agents and levels of group identification, i.e. for all i and pti, αif
′(0) > c(pti).
This implies that all group members will choose a positive level of investment in skills for
any given level of group identity.
In summary, in each period t, group members have an identity pti and a stock of skills,
Hti , which determines their earnings or wealth αif(H
t
i ). We now turn attention to the ques-
tion how these two variables determine the leader’s payoff.
2.2 The Leader’s Decision Problem
The leader selects a level of identity pL ∈ [0, pmax] to maximize his payoff. We specify the per
period payoff function that depends on the identity and the wealth or earnings, αif(Hti ), of
the group members as follows:
n∑
i=1
pi(pti, αif(H
t
i ))
17Skills should not be interpreted as schooling or human capital that is useful both in the immigrant and the
native labor market, but rather as skills that only give an advantage in the native labor market compared to the
immigrant one.
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where pi1(pti, αif(H
t
i )) > 0, pi2(p
t
i, αif(H
t
i )) > 0, that is, the leader’s payoffs are increasing
in identity as well as earnings.18 We further assume that
pi11(p
t
i, αif(H
t
i )) ≤ 0, pi22(pti, αif(Hti )) ≤ 0, pi12(pti, αif(Hti )) ≥ 0.
This implies that the leader payoffs are weakly concave in both identity and earnings. Ad-
ditionally, earnings and identity are (weak) strategic complements in the leader’s utility
function.
Motivated by the examples provided in the introduction, we consider in our analysis
two special cases, namely that of a religious leader (RL), who cares about the identity per se
and a business leader (BL), who cares only about identity as it enhances the profits he ob-
tains from the community. One way to specify these payoff functions is given in equations
(1) and (2):19
piRL(p
t
i, H
t
i ) = βp
t
i + (1− β)αif(Hti ), (1)
piBL(p
t
i, H
t
i ) =
(
pti
)β (
αif(H
t
i )
)1−β
, (2)
Equations (1) and (2) can be seen as two special cases of a CES utility function, (β(pti)
σ +
(1 − β)(αif(Hti ))σ)
1
σ , with σ = 1 and σ → 0. The parameter σ governs the extent to which
the leader sees identity and earnings as strategic complements.
Discussion: Leader Payoff We assume that the leader prefers a community that is as cul-
turally distinct from the host society as possible, but at the same time as wealthy as possible.
This introduces the key trade off of the paper. If the leader only cares about identity, then it
is straightforward to show that he always sets the highest identity possible, pL = pmax. On
the other hand, if the leader only cares about the wealth of the community, then he would
set his identity to zero, in order to foster complete cultural integration. Therefore we focus
our attention to the most interesting case of the leader caring about both identity and earn-
ings. To motivate this further, we discuss a few of the numerous examples that document
that community leaders indeed care about both identity and earnings.
Religious Organizations Religion clearly impacts the identity of its followers. This can be
easily observed in daily life when considering the norms that different religious groups dis-
18As mentioned previously, we focus on steady state outcomes in our analysis and therefore the identities in
and earnings can be considered as starting in steady state.
19 We follow Carvalho and Koyama (2011) in their specification of the payoff function of the religious leader.
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play. Peyes and headscarfs tend to identify the religion of the wearer and thus shape their
identity. The effect of religion in creating specific identities is widely documented, see for
example Breton (1964) and Carvalho and Koyama (2011). Furthermore, leaders care about
the financial wellbeing of their community. This might be due to a need to maximize dona-
tions (Ceylan (2010); Bekkers and Wiepking (2010)) or from a sense of prestige or altruism.
Every religious organization we are aware of asks for donations. A religious leader ben-
efits from these donations as this allows for example to build a better church, synagogue,
mosque or temple. We would further expect a religious leader to care not only about the
spiritual well-being of the community members, but also about their material well-being.
We believe that most religions do want their followers to be able to at least afford food,
clothing and housing.
Foreign Language Media Different from religious institutions, media outlets are profit maxi-
mizing firms. Foreign language media can increase their profits by creating a specific iden-
tity that leads consumers to seek them out more. An example of this is given in Portes
and Sensenbrenner (1993) regarding Latino groups in South Florida, who are described as
completely controlled by three radio stations which determine the identity within this com-
munity. Due to the difference in identity between Hispanics and US Americans, Hispanics
seek out media outlets that provide programs in Spanish, leading to higher profits for such
outlets (Subervi-Velez (1986)). The same patterns can also be found for Chinese language
media (Zhou and Cai (2002)). Further, media outlets finance themselves mainly through
advertising revenue and therefore need to have an audience that is worth being advertised
to. If the community is poor, then it is doubtful that it is a valuable market for businesses.
Therefore, media outlets also have an interest in their community being wealthy. An inter-
esting example of this is described in Zhou and Cai (2002). They show that Chinese media
outlets in the US provide advice to their audience on business opportunities and how to
achieve financial success.
Based on these examples, we argue that community leaders prefer a community that
is both identified with the norms and values propagated as well as wealthy. Addition-
ally, there is evidence that individuals who are more identified with a community are also
willing to contribute more financially (Bekkers and Wiepking (2010)). We therefore impose
the assumption of identity and earnings being strategic complements.20 To simplify our
20We provide additional results in the Appendix for the case of strategic substitutes. However, it is not clear
to us how one could motivate or interpret a case of strategic substitutes in this setting.
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analysis further and in line with the examples provided, we consider a general CES utility
function for the leader. This allows us to consider different types of leaders, that is religious
versus business-oriented leaders, such as foreign-language media. Note however that none
of our results depend on the specific functional forms we impose and the examples of the
religious and business leader only serve to illustrate these results.
As argued previously, it seems plausible that religious leaders are interested in the iden-
tity of their community per se. A natural way to model this is to allow for the religious
leader to have a payoff function that does not have complementarities between identity and
earnings. Different from the religious leader, a business does not care about the creation of
an identity per se. The business cares about identity as it allows to realize higher earnings,
but this is only possible if the follower has a sufficient income. It is natural to capture this
consideration by assuming that identity and earnings are strategic complements.
3 ASSIMILATION DYNAMICS WITH AND WITHOUT LEADER
We first study as a benchmark the assimilation process of a community without leader. This
serves to document the forces towards assimilation in our model and thus highlights why
a leader is crucial to preserve the identity of an immigrant group in the long-run. We then
turn to assimilation in the presence of a leader.
3.1 Benchmark Case: Identity Dynamics without Leader
We consider in turn the optimal skill investment and identity adaptation.
Optimal Skills Investment Each period group members select a level of skills investment
based on the level of group identity they have in this period.21 The optimal investment is
given by the solution of the following maximization problem:
max
Hti≥0
{
αif
(
Hti
)− c (pti)Hti} .
This set-up assumes that group members are myopic which we see as consistent with the
interpretation of identity as a preference for a certain type of behavior. We study in the
21In our specification, we ignore that group members might derive utility from their identity. However, one
can easily adjust the maximization problem and include a term that depends on identity. This will not change
our maximization problem as long as this term enters additively.
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Online Appendix two alternative models with forward looking agents and show that this
assumption does not affect our qualitative results. We solve the maximization problem
using the first order condition, that is both necessary and sufficient and identifies a unique
interior solution.
We write the optimal skill investment as a function H∗(pti;αi). The optimal investment
level is decreasing in pti. As group members identify more with their home group, their
desired level of skill investment decreases, reflecting the greater costs of such assimilation
efforts. Furthermore, agents with higher αi have higher investment levels for any given
identity level pti. As the returns to skills investment increase for immigrants due to higher
productivity, they find it beneficial to invest more.
Identity Dynamics Based on their skill investment in period t, group members update their
identity pt+1i . Recall that the weight given to the host society is given by g(H
t
i ) with H
t
i cho-
sen through functionH∗(pti;αi). Taking this into account we define gˆ(p
t
i;αi) ≡ g(H∗(pti;αi)).
This function gˆ(pti;αi) maps every identity level p
t
i into (0, 1) for a given αi. It is decreasing
in pti as H
∗(pti;αi) is a decreasing function in p
t
i and g(H
t
i ) is increasing in H
t
i . Furthermore,
for every pti it is increasing in αi as a higher αi implies a higher H
∗(pti;αi), which leads to a
higher weight on the host society.
Next period’s identity, pt+1i , can then be written as a function of the previous period
identity levels as follows:
pt+1i =
[
1− gˆ (pti;αi)]

n∑
j=1
γijp
t
j
 (3)
We focus here on the long run assimilation outcome, by studying the steady state of the
system. The steady state identity vector p is characterized by constant identity levels for
each group member that satisfy
pi = [1− gˆ (pi;αi)]

n∑
j=1
γijpj
 . (4)
The corresponding levels of steady state investment H i is equivalent to the optimal skill
investment, H∗(pi;αi). As investment is strictly positive for all identity levels, in the steady
state group members put a strictly positive amount of weight on the host society. We now
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use this property to fully characterize the steady state identity vector for the benchmark
case without leader.
Proposition 1 (Steady State without Leader). ˙
In the steady state without a leader group members assimilate fully with long run identities converg-
ing to zero.
Every group member has a positive level of investment in skills in each period, which
leads to an increasingly higher weight on the host society. A greater weight on the host so-
ciety then leads step-by-step to a lower identification with the group. This might initially be
countered by the network, as a group member might be connected to other group members
that have a higher identity. Therefore, through the influence of peers, identity could ini-
tially increase. Nonetheless, in the long run, all immigrants will be fully assimilated. Note
that our result is not driven by gˆ(0;αi) approaching one or the fact that all group members
invest in skills but owed to the fact that gradually the identity of all group members de-
creases. In particular, the only assumption necessary for this result is that in every period
gˆ(pti;αi) lies between zero and one and is independent of the functional form of gˆ(p
t
i;αi).
A consequence of this is that our result carries over to a setting where some group mem-
bers never invest in skills. This can be the case if the group member’s payoff function is
given by
max
{
αif
(
Hti
)− c (pti)Hti , o} , (5)
where o denotes an outside option.22 To motivate this, consider an immigrant who can
choose to either invest in skills, which improve his chances in the host country labor market
or to pursue a career within his immigrant community. The job within his community does
not require any skill investment and pays an amount of o. For low productivity types it
might then never be optimal to invest in host country specific skills. This does not have an
effect on the long run assimilation outcome, as each group member is still influenced by the
host society as g(H) ∈ (0, 1) for any level of skill investment.
We focus throughout on steady state outcomes, with little attention to the convergence
process. We discuss the speed at which group members assimilate if they assign equal
weights to other group members as a function of their initial identity and their productivity
22This formulation is mathematically equivalent to a discrete production function f(H) which does not pay
anything unless H is sufficiently high, that is a production function that only pays once immigrants have made
a sufficiently high skill investment.
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in greater detail in the Online Appendix. It is worth noting though that the convergence
process does not have to be monotonic. To see this consider first the straightforward case of
isolated group members (γ = 1). In this setting, group members whose initial identity dif-
fers more from that of the host country face a slower assimilation process than those whose
initial identity is more similar. Additionally, individuals who have a higher productivity
assimilate quicker. For them, it is more profitable to invest in skills and therefore at each
point in time, they invest more in skills. This speeds up their assimilation process. If group
members assign positive weights to each other, this pattern does not necessarily hold. For
example, consider an extreme case with a high and low ability group member that assign
weight 1 to each other, and no weight on themselves. Then, even if initially the identities
of both group members are identical, it can be the case that the low ability group member
has a greater convergence speed as it is more influenced by the high ability group member
than the high ability agent himself.
3.2 Identity Dynamics with Leader
We now introduce a leader with some fixed pL and obtain the steady state identities of the
group members. Based on these steady state identities, the leader then sets the optimal
identity.
The updating process of group member i’s identity is given by
pt+1i =
[
1− gˆ (pti;αi)]
λipL + (1− λi) n∑
j=1
γijp
t
j
 . (6)
To guarantee uniqueness of steady state as well as global convergence of the system, we
impose an additional assumption on gˆ(pi;αi).
Assumption 1.
∣∣∣∣∂gˆ(pi;αi)∂pi
∣∣∣∣ pigˆ(pi;αi) < pipmax ∀ pi, αi
The elasticity of gˆ(pi;αi),
∣∣∣∂gˆ(pi;αi)∂pi ∣∣∣ pigˆ(pi;αi) has to be smaller than the fraction pi over
pmax. This assumption guarantees that the identity adjustment process is sufficiently smooth
and small changes in identity today do not have too large of an impact tomorrow. Intu-
itively, it requires that the weight that group members assign to their group does not decline
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too rapidly in response to small decreases in their identity pi.23
We then establish the following result concerning the long run outcome of the setting
with a leader.
Proposition 2 (Steady State with Leader).
In the model with a leader in the influence network:
1. A steady state exists.
2. There is no full assimilation into the host society. In every steady state, a group member’s identity
is a strictly convex combination of the position of the host society and that of the leader.
3. If Assumption 1 holds the steady state is unique and group member identities converge globally.
Proposition 2 establishes that a steady state always exists. Further, Assumption 1 en-
sures that the steady state is unique and group member identities converge globally. Our
convergence result here applies to a setting not studied elsewhere and thereby complements
and extends other results in the literature.24 Specifically, Büchel et al. (2014) require the up-
dating matrix to be symmetric ultrametric to establish convergence in their setting. We do
not need such restrictions and as they exclude any inessential communication classes their
methodology cannot be extended to our setting.25 Panebianco (2014) studies a model with
multiple traits and vertical as well as oblique socialization. There are two main differences
to our model. First, in our setting, we do not impose a condition requiring strictly positive
diagonals in our updating matrix, while this property is key in Panebianco (2014)’s analy-
sis.26 Second, our model permits greater time variation than the main convergence result
in Panebianco (2014) (Proposition 2), which permits time-variation only on the diagonal.
Corollary 1 in Panebianco (2014) allows for more general time variation, but this result re-
stricts attention to cases with one communication class. Our model with leader as analyzed
in Proposition 2, however, inherently has at least two communication classes. Thus, the
23The assumption does not rely on the fact that group members choose skill investment optimally given their
identity. All we need is a function that depends on identity which fulfills the property of Assumption 1. How
we arrive at this function is per se irrelevant.
24The characterization of the steady state outcome as a convex combination of the identity of the host soci-
ety and the leader mirrors DeMarzo et al. (2003, Theorem 10). However, they derive the result for the time-
homogeneous case only.
25See Büchel et al. (2014) for a definition of inessential communication class. Intuitively, a communication
class is essential if each member of the class is only connected to other members of the class, but not to agents
outside the class. If a communication is not essential, it is inessential. See also Lorenz (2005) for further back-
ground on this approach.
26There an assumption on payoffs ensures that parents always put strictly positive effort into socialization (as
shown in Proposition 1 of Panebianco (2014)). This property is then a key element of the proof of Proposition
2 (p. 603) in Panebianco (2014), ensuring acyclic updating matrices. We do not impose this restriction and in
principle allow for zero diagonal entries for group members.
17
results from Panebianco (2014) do not translate to our setting.
In addition to dealing with a case not studied elsewhere, we also offer a novel approach
to establish convergence and uniqueness of the long-run steady state in the class of cultural
transmission models. As we show in detail in the Appendix, the elasticity condition As-
sumption 1 ensures that the updating process forms a contraction using a suitable metric
and therefore converges to a unique steady state from any given starting point, avoiding
multiplicity of long-run outcomes. If Assumption 1 is violated in the sense that the influ-
ence assigned to the host society is too responsive to changes in group member identity, we
cannot exclude the presence of cycling and multiple steady states.
In terms of our application, the result shows that the presence of a leader, who is not
susceptible to any influence, generally prevents full assimilation.27 However, the group
members will assimilate to some extent in any steady state.
If we consider the case where group members have a discrete payoff function as speci-
fied in equation (5), then our results remain unchanged. Assumption 1 is still satisfied, as
now a change in pmight either not trigger a change in the weight placed on the host society
or the change is as described before, depending on whether there is positive skill invest-
ment or not.
Network Structure and Integration The long-run assimilation patterns of a community
depend on the network structure within the group. In order to characterize the interplay
between the network and the steady state identities, we first require additional notation. I
is the n × n identity matrix, and Λ and Gˆ(p) are n × n diagonal matrices with element ii
given by λi and gˆ
(
pti;αi
)
, respectively. The network structure is characterized by the n× n
matrix Γ, which contains the weights group members assign to each other and themselves,
γij . Last, 1 denotes a n column vector of ones.
Proposition 3. For an arbitrary influence network Γ, the steady state identity vector for group
members is characterized by
p =
{
I− (I−Λ)
[
I− Gˆ(p)
]
Γ
}−1
[I− Gˆ(p)]Λ1pL. (7)
Equation (7) brings out the role of the network structure Γ that captures the social re-
27If the leader were susceptible to influence by the group members, the leader would place a strictly positive
weight on their identity. This is mathematically equivalent to the leader not being present at all, and we would
end up with full integration into the host society in steady state as per Proposition 1.
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lations among the members of the group. The steady state identities p are pinned down
by an equation that mirrors the weighted Bonacich centrality, a concept highlighting the
importance of a node in a network.28 In our setting, however, the network structure is less
important for assimilation outcomes compared to individual productivity and the influence
of the leader. To see this note that the second part of (7), [I − Gˆ(p)]Λ1pL, only depends on
the leader’s identity and individual productivities.29
The network structure merely comes into play in the first part of equation (7). Note that
this term is an n× n matrix and can be rewritten and reinterpreted as an infinite sum:
{
I− (I−Λ)
[
I− Gˆ(p)
]
Γ
}−1
=
∞∑
k=0
{
(I−Λ)
[
I− Gˆ(p)
]}k
Γk. (8)
The impact of the network on identity is given by Γk, which reflects the influence weights
among the group after k iterations. This expression adds up the direct and indirect influ-
ences for each group member across the group member network Γ and weighs them in a
way such that shorter network connections receive higher weight than longer ones. Addi-
tionally, the influence weight are affected by the weights assigned to the group leaders. We
provide a more detailed discussion and an illustration of how different network structures
affect the group members’ identities in the Online Appendix.
Comparative Statics of Ability α and Group Division γ If the steady state is unique, we
can study the effect of αi as well as the effect of γij on steady state identities as foundation
for our analysis of policy instruments. To focus on the parameters of interest we assume
λi = λ ∀ i. If all group members have the same αi, that is the same productivity, then all
group members will respond symmetrically and thus have the same gˆ(pi;αi) function. As
a consequence the long run identities of the group members are the same, independently of
the weights on other group members γij .
Remark 4 ( Ability αi = α ∀ i).
If all group members have the same level of ability and leader influence, the steady state identity
vector is invariant to the structure of the group network.
28Bonacich centrality is a recursive measure of node prominence in a network which assigns higher cen-
trality to nodes that are connected to nodes that themselves have a high centrality. Formally, it is defined by
C(Γ, a, b) = {I− bΓ}−1 aΓ1, where aΓ represents the so-called base value and b is a scalar that describes the
decay factor, that is the rate at which the contribution of other nodes to node i’s centrality decays with their dis-
tance from i. For further details, see e.g. pp.40-43 in Jackson (2008). The weighted Bonacich centrality allows
for heterogeneity in a across nodes Ballester et al. (2006), p. 1409.
29Recall that gˆ(pi, αi) is a function of productivity and so Gˆ(p) is as well.
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In contrast, if there is heterogeneity in ability αi, then the long run identities of the
group members differ. To see this more clearly, suppose again that there are two types of
group members, A and B. These two types differ in their ability, such that αA > αB . We
furthermore assume that the influence structure is fully symmetric across members and
types and captured by a single parameter γ, the group division specifying the total weight
put on all group members of the same type.30 Furthermore, both types share the same
leader influence parameter λi. Steady state identity levels for A and B in this setting can
then be summarized by:
pA = [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] {λpL + (1− λ) [γpA + (1− γ) pB]} (9)
pB = [1− gˆ(pB;αB)] {λpL + (1− λ) [γpB + (1− γ) pA]} (10)
Note that for a given identity level group member A invests more in skills than B resulting
in a higher weight on the host society for A. Based on equations (9) and (10) we can then
analyze steady state behavior of this setting in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5 (Identity Spread for Different Types). Suppose there are two types of group mem-
bers, A and B, with αA > αB . Then, in the steady state:
1. Type A agents assimilate more than those of type B that is pA < pB .
2. A higher group division, that is, a higher γ leads to more dispersed identities.
The difference between steady state identities of A and B is decreasing in the weight
they assign to each other, that is ∂pA∂γ < 0 and
∂pB
∂γ > 0. This implies that if group di-
vision is high, that is, group members do not influence each other, then the steady state
identities differ greatly across the two types. On the other hand, if the community is more
connected, then skill investment and identities are less dispersed and there is greater equal-
ity in outcomes. This also carries over to skill acquisition and earnings. If identities are
more different, then so are earnings.
4 STRATEGIC LEADER IDENTITY CHOICE
Up to this point, the norms and the values of the leader have been taken as given. In this sec-
tion we consider the strategic choice a leader faces and the conditions under which leaders
30Note that as group members of the same type are homogeneous, the within-type influence weights do not
affect the dynamics and final outcome.
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implement different steady-state levels of assimilation of their community. In particular, we
show when the leader implements an intermediate level of assimilation that falls between
the full integration and the maximum distinction outcomes. We then proceed to an analysis
of comparative statics and policy implications in Section 5.
In what follows we assume that group members are homogeneous with αi = α and
λi = λ for all i. In addition we simplify the marginal cost function of investment in skills
such that c(pt) = c0 + c1pt with c0 > 0 and c1 > 0.
The leader’s payoff is a function of both identity p and group members’ earnings αf(H).
The steady state skill investment is again determined by the steady state identity and so we
rewrite income as αfˆ(p;α) ≡ αf(H∗(p;α)). Note that fˆ(p;α) is decreasing in p. This derives
from the fact that f(H) is increasing in H and H∗(p;α) is decreasing in p.
The leader sets pL, which influences p through the steady state condition:
p = [1− gˆ(p;α)] {λpL + (1− λ) p} , (11)
Given Assumption 1, the impact of pL on p is strictly positive.31 This implies that a higher
identity of the leader is always associated with lower assimilation of group members.
We focus in what follows on the case where the leader chooses intermediate assimilation
(0 < pL < pmax) for the general payoff function pi(p, αfˆ(p, α)) (instead of extremism (pL =
pmax) and full assimilation (pL = 0)).
Proposition 6 (Intermediate Assimilation). If there exists an interior solution and fˆ(p;α) is
a concave function, then the leader implements an intermediate level of assimilation with pL ∈
(0, pmax).
If an interior solution exists and the group member’s payoff function is a concave func-
tion in p, then intermediate cultural distinction emerges.32 A concave fˆ(p;α) implies that a
small decrease in identity at pmax leads to a large increase in investment in skills and thus
to a large increase in earnings. On the other hand, an increase in identity at pL = 0 leads
to a negligible loss in earnings. This implies that the leader can increase the community’s
income drastically by reducing cultural distinction if identity is high, but there is no great
loss in earnings if he increases cultural distinction if it is low. Thus, with a concave earn-
ings function the leader will prefer the community to assimilate to some extent. Note that
31See the proof to Proposition 6 in the Appendix for a formal proof.
32The concavity of the earnings function is driven by the sign of f ′′′(H), with f ′′′(H) < 0 guaranteeing a
concave earnings function. We provide further details in the Appendix.
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the concavity of fˆ(p;α) is a sufficient condition. Thus, if the earnings function fˆ(p;α) is
convex and an interior solution exists, then it might still be optimal for the leader to choose
intermediate assimilation.
Identity
Earnings
Leader Indifference Curve
αfˆ(p)
p¯(pmax)0
Figure 2: Illustration of Strategic Leader Identity Choice
Figure 2 illustrates the leader’s problem and conveys some of the intuition behind Propo-
sition 6. The thicker line shows the feasible combinations of group member earnings and
group member identity that can be implemented with a given level of leader identity pL.
The feasible group member identities lie between 0 and p(pmax), that is, the group member
identity that results from the leader selecting the largest possible degree of distinction. Note
that even at that level, there is some skills investment by group members and thus positive
earnings. The thinner curves are indifference curves of the leader payoff function. The op-
timal leader identity selects the point on the thicker line that lies on the highest possible
indifference curve.
In order to provide some more intuition on possible assimilation outcomes, we turn to
the special cases of the religious and business leader.
Proposition 7 (Religious & Business Leader). .
1. Unless there exists an interior solution and fˆ(p;α) is a concave function, the religious leader
selects either the most extreme norms and values, pmax, or full assimilation.
2. The business leader never chooses full assimilation.
In the case of the religious leader, concavity of fˆ(p;α) ensures intermediate assimila-
tion, which follows immediately from Proposition 6. However, it can also be the case that
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the religious leader chooses extremism or full assimilation. The latter occurs if the earnings
function is convex as this implies that a small decrease in p away from pmax has only a small
impact. In order to realize high earnings with a convex fˆ(p;α), the identity has to decrease
significantly. Therefore, if the earnings function is convex, the religious leader chooses ei-
ther full assimilation or no assimilation at all, depending on which extreme identity yields
the highest payoff.33
Similar to the religious leader, the business leader might also choose the most extreme
level of norms, if he does not opt for intermediate assimilation. However, unlike the reli-
gious leader, it is never optimal for the business leader to set pL = 0. If he were to do so, he
would earn zero profits. A small increase in identity increases earnings and leads to strictly
positive profits.
If group members are only willing to invest in skills if the payoff from this is sufficiently
high, see again equation (5), then the leader’s maximization problem is unchanged. If the
optimal outcome is extremism or intermediate assimilation with group members investing
in skills, then the result remains unchanged in the presence of an outside option. However,
complete assimilation can no longer be an equilibrium, which follows trivially from the fact
that lowering identity below a certain threshold will not result in an increase in skills and
therefore earnings. The logic is similar for intermediate assimilation with group members
not investing in skills. This induces the leader to set a higher identity, which results in less
assimilation.
5 COMPARATIVE STATICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
We now turn to the comparative statics and connect our findings to policy implications. We
consider in turn the effect of a change in productivity α, the effect of a lump sum transfer,
z, and last the effect of a change in group ties γ.
Effect of Change in Productivity We are interested in the effect of an increase in α, that
is an increase in productivity. Such an increase in productivity can emerge through lower
discrimination, as with lower discrimination investment in skills leads to a higher payoff.
In this sense considering the effect of α sheds light on the impact of a policy aimed at
33 This depends on pmax as well as on α and β. If pmax is sufficiently large, then the religious leader always
prefers the highest possible cultural distinction. For smaller pmax, a higher productivity α and lower β, where
β is the weight the leader assigns to identity, make full assimilation more likely.
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decreasing discrimination.34 Our finding is summarized in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 (Comparative Statics α). .
If the leader chooses intermediate assimilation, then as α increases:
1. The leader selects a higher pL resulting in higher group member identity p.
2. Group member income increases.
In case of intermediate assimilation, a higher α results in an increase in the identity the
leader sets. An increase in α leads to an increase in the marginal payoff from investing in
skills, resulting in an increase in skill investment for a given leader identity. In response, the
leader adjusts his identity and in fact he will increase it, resulting in both wealthier and less
assimilated group members. Note that identity and skill investment are not only affected
by marginal changes, but also by level effects, which will become clear when we consider
the effect of a lump sum transfer.
To shed some further light on when skills increase, remain constant or decrease we
consider the steady state payoffs of the religious and business leaders.
Corollary 8.1 (Religious vs Business Leader: Skill Investment). .
With a religious leader skill investment is unaffected by a change in α, whereas with a business leader
skill investment increases.
To see that skill investment remains constant in case of a religious leader, consider the
first order condition given by
β + (1− β)αf ′(H)∂H
∂p
= 0 ⇔ β + (1− β) f
′(H)
f ′′(H)
c1 = 0 (12)
Equation (12) is independent of α and so the optimal H∗ is unaffected by a change in α.
In contrast, for the business leader a change in α increases skill investment. The identity is
not increased by so much as to crowd out the increase in skill investment completely.
To summarize, an increase in productivity α without the presence of a leader induces
immigrants to invest more in skills, which results in higher wages and greater assimila-
tion and, thus, higher cultural distinction is related to lower earnings. In the presence of a
leader this result does no longer hold as the leader sets a higher level of cultural distinction
34Recall that skill investment is only beneficial for individuals when they enter the native labor market. Skills
should not be thought of as, for example, education but rather language skills and understanding of norms and
values in the host society. Therefore, if the returns to these skills are low, then it can be interpreted as facing a
host country with high discrimination.
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which leads the community to be less integrated. The increase in α thus leads to both higher
wealth and higher identity.
Effect of a Lump Sum Transfer We are interested in the effect of a lump sum transfer z to
the immigrant group member from the host country on identity, earnings and skill invest-
ment. Many European countries have social security systems that are also accessible for
immigrants. We are interested in the effect of these security systems on cultural integration.
The income of a group member who obtains these transfers is then given by αfˆ(p;α) + z.
Proposition 9 (Effect of a Lump Sum Transfer). Suppose the leader chooses intermediate assim-
ilation. Then, a lump sum transfer z leads to weakly higher cultural distinction, weakly lower skill
investment and higher earnings.
An exogenous increase in earnings that does not hinge on skill investment can change
the decision problem of the leader. In particular, it might decrease skill investment as the
leader is not dependent on this investment to increase the community’s earnings. This
implies that a group member’s identity might increase. Last, the effect on overall earnings
is positive. As we have seen previously, a religious leader chooses always the same amount
of skill investment. Therefore, in this case, a transfer has no effect. This is not true for
the business leader, where the lump sum transfer will increase identity and decrease skill
investment.
Corollary 9.1 (Effect of a Lump Sum Transfer: Business Leader vs Religious Leader). A
business leader choosing intermediate assimilation will increase the identity selected in response to
an increase in z. This in turn leads to lower skill investment of the group members. In case of
a religious leader, a lump sum transfer has no impact on the identity selected. This holds if the
religious leader chooses intermediate assimilation as well as if he decides between full assimilation
and extremism.
This shows that a religious leader’s position is never affected by a transfer. In particular,
a religious leader who chooses extremism is not more inclined to switch to the full assimi-
lation equilibrium. Denote by p(pmax) the identity reached when the leader sets pL = pmax.
Suppose the leader sets the maximum identity and prefers this to full assimilation. Then,
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he will also be an extremist in case of a transfer as
βp(pmax) + (1− β)(αfˆ(p(pmax)) + z) > (1− β)(αfˆ(0) + z)
⇔ βp(pmax) + (1− β)(αfˆ(p(pmax))) > (1− β)αfˆ(0).
Our finding sheds light on the fact that in our setting it is not just a change in the marginal
productivity that has an effect on skill investment, identity and earnings, but also a level
change.
Similar to the effects of an increase in α, an increase in the lump sum transfer z leads to
a weakly higher identity and strictly higher earnings.
We abstract here from an analysis of the impact of an increase in productivity α or a
lump sum transfer z on welfare. It is natural to assume that welfare depends both on earn-
ings and identity.35 Then an increase in α makes individuals better off (assuming costs are
not too high), as both earnings and identity increase following an increase in either α. Simi-
larly, an increase in z makes individuals better off. Thus, these type of policies increase the
welfare of immigrants, but they do not foster cultural integration. This is summarized in
the following remark.
Remark 10. Higher earnings do not affect the degree of integration.
We can have immigrant groups that have a high cultural distinction from the host so-
ciety, but as they are very productive, they still have high earnings. In this case, earnings
and identity are positively correlated. However, this comparison only holds across groups.
Within groups agents with higher productivity have higher earnings than those with lower
productivity and so earnings and identity are negatively related.
Heterogeneous Group Members Next, we allow again for heterogeneity in ability. We re-
strict attention to two types, A and B with αA > αB , and the symmetric influence structure
summarized by equations (9) and (10). We ask how the optimal identity set by the leader
responds to group members being more or less connected, that is how changes in the mea-
sure of group division γ affects pL. Recall that a lower γ implies that an individual is more
strongly influenced by his peers of another type. Our analysis sheds some light on the fact
35Alternatively, welfare could only depend on earnings and then the effect of a parameter change on welfare
is the same as that on earnings.
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that groups in which ties are more important exhibit a very different assimilation pattern,
not only because of the ties per se, but also because of the effect on the leader. This can have
effects on how assimilationist policies might be structured for different types of groups.
Proposition 11 (Comparative Statics γ). Consider the two-type setting with αA > αB character-
ized in equations (9) and (10). Let gˆ(pi;αi) be a concave function and γ ≥ 12 . Additionally, assume
that ∂pi(p,αfˆ(p;α))∂p is concave. Suppose the leader chooses intermediate assimilation. Then, a decrease
in group division γ leads to a greater level of cultural distinction, to a higher pL. The identity of A
increases and so his investment and earnings decrease. The effect on identity and thus investment
and earnings of B is ambiguous.
One implication of gˆ(pi;αi) being concave is that an increase in the weight that group
members assign to each other will lead to an increase in pA that is smaller than the decrease
pB , keeping pL fixed. However, the leader has an incentive to adjust his identity and in
particular, if γ decreases then the leader has an incentive to increase pL. To see this more
clearly, consider the first order condition of the leader when faced with a group that consists
of two types:
(
∂pi(pA, wA)
∂pA
+
∂pi(pA, wA)
∂wA
∂wA
∂pA
)
∂pA
∂pL
+
(
∂pi(pB, wB)
∂pB
+
∂pi(pB, wB)
∂wB
∂wB
∂pB
)
∂pB
∂pL
= 0
(13)
Given our assumption that induces an interior solution, we know that
(
∂pi(pA, wA)
∂pA
+
∂pi(pA, wA)
∂wA
∂wA
∂pA
)
> 0 >
(
∂pi(pB, wB)
∂pB
+
∂pi(pB, wB)
∂wB
∂wB
∂pB
)
(14)
This implies that when γ decreases, for fixed pL, the value of both the LHS and RHS of
equation (14) move closer to zero. Additionally, as the leader has a greater influence on
type B, it has to hold that
(
∂pi(pA,wA)
∂pA
+ ∂pi(pA,wA)∂wA
∂wA
∂pA
)
>
∣∣∣(∂pi(pB ,wB)∂pB + ∂pi(pB ,wB)∂wB ∂wB∂pB )∣∣∣ for
equation (13) to hold. This implies that the decrease in γ leads equation (13) to be positive
and it is optimal for the leader to increase pL. Therefore, societies with a lower group
division, that is, higher group cohesion, will induce the leader to choose a higher level of
cultural distinction.
Note that the assumption that ∂pi(p,αfˆ(p;α))∂p is a concave function is a sufficient condition
and our results also hold as long as the difference between the second order conditions,
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∂2pi(pA,αAfˆ(pA;αA))
∂p2A
and ∂
2pi(pB ,αB fˆ(pB ;αB))
∂p2B
of group members A and B is not too large.36
The increase in pL following a decrease in γ leads for group member A to an increase in
identity. His identity increases when γ decreases and pL remains fixed. Now, pL increases
as well leading to a further rise in his identity. From this it follows that the skill investment
and earnings of the high productivity group member decrease. The effect on the identity
of the low productivity group member is ambiguous. His identity would decrease if γ de-
creases and pL were kept fixed. The decrease in pL now goes against this effect and so the
overall effect on identity is ambiguous. The same holds true for the effect on his skill in-
vestment and earnings.
Our analysis assumes throughout that group members do not sever their ties to the
community or that group leaders cannot exclude some group members. We relax this as-
sumption and discuss a setting where ties to the community can be cut in depth in the
Online Appendix. We first show that in a setting with two types of group members, the
leader never has an incentive to exclude members from the group. If a member cuts ties
if his identity is too low, then the leader reacts to this by increasing his identity in order
to retain the group member that wants to leave. Therefore, in such a setting, leaders can
have even less incentives to integrate. We further consider the effect of a change in group
members’ productivity and show that the results obtained here carry over highlighting the
robustness of our findings.
6 DISCUSSION
The predictions we derived can be connected to several stylized facts and can help under-
stand different patterns in the assimilation of immigrants or minorities as well as possible
policy implications.
Jewish Assimilation after Emancipation The case of the Jewish Assimilation after Eman-
cipation in Germany and Hungary is documented in Carvalho and Koyama (2011). They
show that Jewish communities in Germany assimilated to German customs under the influ-
ence of religious leaders. Rabbis changed the religious procedures such that less time was
required to be spent at the synagogue. Additionally, organ music, traditionally a Chris-
tian custom, was introduced and sermons started to be held in German instead of Hebrew.
36 The condition is always fulfilled for the religious leader if f (4)(H) ≤ 0.
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All these changes can be seen as increased assimilation to German customs and traditions.
However, the assimilation took place at the same time as the building of many new syna-
gogues. During that period, the German communities became very wealthy and invested
in the construction of many new synagogues.37 In contrast, the community leaders in Hun-
gary started creating norms and customs that required their followers to spend more time at
the synagogue. They also imposed dress codes that emphasized the difference between the
Jewish community and the wider Hungarian society. Carvalho and Koyama (2011) argue
that these difference in development stem from diverse economic environments: Germany
was already industrialized, while the Hungarian economy was still largely agrarian.
In terms of our model, we think of rabbis as religious leaders that end up choosing be-
tween full assimilation versus extremism. In our model this requires that their earnings
function is convex in identity. We argue that at the time, such an earnings function seems
indeed plausible. A convex earnings function implies that a small change in identity, away
from the community’s original identity has a relatively small impact on earnings. In the
case of the Jewish communities, this means that as long as individuals were still showing
that they were Jewish to a noticeable degree they were not rewarded in terms of higher
economic earnings. Only complete assimilation resulted in full admission to the economy.
Katz (1980) offers supporting evidence for this. First, the process of emancipation was a
slow one. It started out in 1780, but did not last in some places. In fact, there are instances
were citizen rights were withdrawn again. Only by 1848-1849 did Jews have full equality
in all of Germany. This provides evidence that Jews were not welcomed to be part of Ger-
man society as Jews. Additionally, this was the period were strong anti-Semitism emerged
in Germany, see Katz (1980).38 Making cultural traits unnoticeable might therefore have
helped to overcome these prejudices. As already emphasized, one key difference between
Hungary and Germany was the productivity in the environment. Assimilation in Hungary
would not have reaped the same benefits as in Germany. In terms of our model, this would
imply significant differences in α that can result in markedly different responses by leaders
with a convex earnings function: full assimilation in one case and maximum differentiation
in the other.
Our model thus sheds light on why different communities in different countries choose
37Note that we are only interested in assimilation as far as it concerns economic outcomes. So, even though
the Jewish community persisted it was on many important issues not that different from Christian communities.
38The Jewish communities in Germany adapted to German cultural traits, despite great animosity towards
them, which likely resulted in strong discrimination, a pattern that is surprisingly in line with the predictions
of our model.
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different paths for assimilation and how this is driven by their religious leaders. The ex-
ample of the Jewish communities is additionally of interest, as these communities had ex-
actly one religious leader, without competition: communities often did not agree with the
leader’s position but still had no alternative but to follow it. Thus, this is a setting that is
very much in line with our model.39
Muslim Integration is Different from that of other Immigrants to Europe Researchers
frequently comment that Muslim integration in Europe seems to differ from that of other
communities (Bisin et al. (2008) for the UK; Constant et al. (2006) and Haug (2008) for Ger-
many). The predictions of our model are in line with several features of this integration
process. One possible reason for this is that Imams in Muslim communities seem to be of
greater importance than religious leaders in other communities (see Ceylan (2010)), but in
addition they also seem to differ along various other dimensions.
First, a majority of the Imams in Germany are employed by the Turkish government and
serve for only 4-5 years in Germany. Their knowledge of German is limited, with only 50%
of the Imams taking German classes (Halm et al. (2012)). Sermons are traditionally held in
Turkish. The situation is similar in the UK, as documented in Geaves (2008) where more
than 90% of Imams come from abroad. In addition, similar to the situation in Germany,
the majority of Imams only arrived in the UK less than five years ago and was educated
and raised in an environment with very different norms and cultural values than those
prevalent in the UK. There are in fact a few Imams that were raised and educated in Britain.
Nonetheless, even those Imams give sermons in Urdu, the prevalent language of origin for
Muslims in the UK.
Second, the income of German Imams, due to their special employment status, does
not depend on how wealthy their community is. This is different from Imams in the UK.
However, it seems plausible that Imams put less emphasis on high earnings, given that
they tend to come from a poor background. This seems also to be reflected in the pattern
of earnings of religious leaders with Imams earning only little. The average earnings of
clergy in the UK lies at approximately £20,000 (see the 2013 Annual Survey of Hours and
Earnings), whereas it is reported that Imams make between £10,000 and £12,000 a year.40 In
terms of our model this translates into a lower β, which would lead to greater emphasis on
39For evidence on this and a summary of the situation of the Jewish communities, see Carvalho and Koyama
(2011).
40See an article in The Guardian on www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2007/jun/05/vacancyforanimam
(accessed 27.10.2016).
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cultural values compared to earnings and thus to a culturally more distinct community.
Additionally, many Muslim communities have strong family values. According to a
standard classification based on the work of Hofstede (1984), Turkey and Pakistan, the two
most prominent source countries for Muslim immigration to Germany and the UK, are
defined to be collectivist, where an individual is less important compared to the community.
In such an environment, we would argue that community members put a higher weight on
the influence of other members. In terms of our model, this implies a higher level of cultural
distinction, not only because the group is cohesive per se, but also because it induces the
leader to impose values and norms of higher cultural distinction.
Another feature of the assimilation process is that Muslim immigrants tend to hang on
to their cultural traits and religion more so than other immigrants. In particular, the as-
similation of second generation immigrants is lower than that of other religious and ethnic
groups. Arguably, Muslim immigrants come from a culturally more different background
than other immigrant groups, slowing their assimilation process. This is in line with our
prediction that assimilation occurs more quickly for those from an already similar back-
ground.
Further, unlike other groups, Muslims with higher wages tend to be more religious
and more identified with their religion, compared to poorer Muslims. This is in line with
our prediction that if leaders can set norms and values, then when comparing two distinct
groups, as suggested in Bisin et al. (2008), the members of the group with higher ability end
up with higher identity and higher earnings.
Finally, our model draws attention to the finding that Imams educated in the UK do
not choose different norms and values compared to Imams coming from abroad (Geaves
(2008)). We predict that leaders that are strategic will respond to the incentives that are in
place in the community and thus different leaders may well end up with the same level of
cultural distinction, independently of their individual background.
Extremism and Wealth Our model also sheds some light on the fact that higher cultural
distinction is not correlated with wealth or earnings. Our findings are in line with Krueger
(2008), who argues that poverty will not lead to the emergence of extremism and finds little
correlation between extremism, terrorism and poor economic conditions. We consider two
different channels of why wealth is not a predictor of cultural distinction. In particular,
we distinguish between an increase in productivity and the effect of a lump-sum transfer.
In case of a religious leader, who decides between full assimilation and extremism, we find
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that an increase in productivity might induce full assimilation. But this is only the case if the
jump in productivity is sufficiently high. It might also be that an increase in productivity has
no effect whatsoever. In contrast, a transfer will never induce the religious leader to change
from extremism to full assimilation. Generally, a transfer only affects earnings, and has no
impact on identity or skills and thereby earnings. An increase in productivity, however,
induces higher cultural distinction if the religious leader chooses intermediate assimilation.
Higher productivity will lead to higher earnings without affecting skill investment.
Based on this we predict that when governments support immigrants economically and
accommodate their specific cultural traits, then this will not foster cultural integration. This
pattern has, in fact, been empirically documented by Koopmans (2010). He compares socio-
economic outcomes of immigrants across different European countries and finds that coun-
tries that do not provide strong incentives for host-country language acquisition, but have a
strong welfare state have produced low levels of labor market participation of immigrants.
On the other hand, the United Kingdom, despite having multicultural policies in place, has
a higher labor market participation. Koopmans (2010) argues that this is due to the rel-
atively lean welfare state and suggests that governments might want to restrict access to
welfare and social security in order to encourage immigrant labor force participation. Our
analysis highlights that the instruments of a welfare state, even though they improve the
welfare of immigrants, reduce the incentives to cultural integration.41
7 CONCLUSION
We develop a model of the assimilation process of an immigrant community with a leader,
describing the evolution of the skills and identities of community members. In the absence
of a leader, our setting predicts complete assimilation. The presence of a leader can pre-
vent this and lead to persistent identity differences between immigrant community and
host society. We characterize the circumstances in which leaders choose full assimilation,
intermediate assimilation or extremism with maximum differentiation.
We proceed to show that higher productivity of the environment can lead to a commu-
nity that is both wealthier and more identified with the immigrant community as the leader
might choose higher cultural distinction. Further, we consider the effect of group members
41Targeting the income of the leader, for example by direct funding, likewise does not have the desired effect:
by increasing the financial income of leaders the marginal return for wealth relative to identity decreases, once
again providing an incentive for leaders to implement a lower degree of group assimilation.
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being more influenced by their peers. If the community is more cohesive, then the leader
can have incentives to choose more different norms and values.
Our model has been silent on the emergence of leaders. Many immigrants are second
generation immigrants, who were born into a community in which they were exposed to
a leader, rendering plausible the assumption of immigrants not selecting an their leader.
Nonetheless, we believe that modelling the emergence of these leaders is a fruitful area for
future research. Finally, our analysis offers a number of predictions that could be assessed
if adequate data were available.
A PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1 – Steady State in the Benchmark Case without Leader
Verify by inspection that pi = 0 ∀ i is a solution to the steady state condition in equation
(4). To establish uniqueness and convergence, rewrite equation (3) in matrix form, pt+1 =[
I− Gˆ (pt, α)]Γpt, where pt is the vector of identities. I is the identity matrix and we define
Gˆ
(
pt, α
)
to be the n × n matrix with diagonal elements Gˆii
(
pt
)
= gˆ(pti;αi) and zeros else-
where. Γ is the group member influence matrix defined by Γij = γij . Solving backwards
yields pt =
∏t−1
s=0
[
I− Gˆ (ps, α)
]
· Γtp0.42 Long run behavior of pt as t→∞ depends on the
behavior of two factors, which we consider separately. First, limt→∞
∏t−1
s=0
[
I− Gˆ (ps, α)
]
is a diagonal matrix with element (i, i) given by limt→∞
∏t−1
s=0 [1− gˆ(psi ;αi)] = 0 so that
the matrix converges to a zero matrix. Second, Γ is row stochastic with limit limt→∞ Γt
bounded above. This implies limt→∞
∏t−1
s=0
[
I− Gˆ (ps, α)
]
Γtp0 = 0 as required.43
Proof of Proposition 2 - Steady State with Leader
Existence and Characterization as Convex Combination
Rewrite the updating process of the vector of group member identities into a new identity
vector as p′ = Φ(p). A steady state identity vector is then a fixed point of Φ(·).
The domain and co-domain of Φ(·) are the closed interval [0, pmax]n. Continuity of
Φ(·) follows from its definition in equation (6). Therefore by Brouwer’s Fixed Point The-
42For this proof a superscript t applied to a matrix such as Γ denotes Γ taken to the tth power while a
superscript on a vector such as p refers to the vector p in period t.
43Note that alternatively our setting without leader can be rewritten as a repeated averaging process of n+ 1
players in which there is one column that contains strictly positive entries. The convergence result then follows
from Theorem 4 of Chatterjee and Seneta (1977). That paper does not provide a characterization of the steady-
state outcome.
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orem, Φ(·) has a fixed point and there exists a steady state. To show pi ∈ (0, pL) ∀i we
consider each boundary separately and proceed by contradiction. The result then fol-
lows. First, suppose p˜ is a fixed point of Φ(p) and there exists a player such that p˜i =
0. Then, Φi(p˜) = [1− gˆ (p˜i;αi)]
[
λipL + (1− λi)
∑n
j=1 γijpj
]
, which is strictly greater than
zero because gˆ (p˜i;αi) < 1, λi > 0 and pL > 0. Thus, p˜ is not a fixed point, deliver-
ing the contradiction. Second, suppose p˜ is a fixed point of Φ(p) and there is a player
with p˜i ≥ pL. Label the player with the highest p˜i as imax. Then p˜imax ≥ pL. Again,
Φimax(p˜) = [1− gˆ (p˜imax ;αimax)]
[
λipL + (1− λi)
∑n
j=1 γijpj
]
, which is strictly less than p˜imax
as gˆ (p˜i;αi) > 0. This implies p˜ is not a fixed point, delivering the contradiction.
Uniqueness and Convergence
We show that the updating process with leader described by equation (6) is a contraction
under a suitable norm and then appeal to Blackwell’s contraction mapping theorem to show
uniqueness and convergence.
Let Φ(p) be the one period updating process of group member identity vector p yield-
ing next period vector p′. Then for Φ(p) to be a contraction we need to show that for ev-
ery two n-dimensional identity vectors p 6= q and for some norm ‖·‖ and scalar c < 1,
‖Φ(p)− Φ(q)‖ ≤ c ‖p− q‖. Equation (6) and assumptions on gˆ(·) imply that Φ(p) is con-
tinuous and differentiable everywhere. We can then prove that Φ(·) is a contraction via the
Jacobian J (Φ(p)) if there exists a matrix norm ‖·‖ of J and scalar c < 1 such that for every p,
‖J (Φ(p)) ‖ ≤ c.44 We use is the matrix norm induced by the∞-vector norm defined for ma-
trix A as ‖A‖∞ = maxi
[∑
j Aij
]
. Φ(p) is therefore a contraction if maxi
[∑
j Jij (Φ(p))
]
< 1.
Computing the elements of the Jacobian
∂Φi(p)
∂pi
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λi)γii +
λipL + (1− λi)∑
j
(γijpj)

[
−αi∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
]
∂Φi(p)
∂pj
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λi)
∑
j 6=i
γij ,
44See Judd (1998, Theorem 5.4.1) for the approach adopted here.
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we derive the following sufficient condition:
‖J (Φ(p)) ‖ = max
i
[1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λi) +
λipL + (1− λi)∑
j
(γijpj)

[
−∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
]
≤ max
i
[
[1− gˆ(pi;αi)] + pmax
[
−∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
]]
< 1. (15)
The LHS of expression (15) provides an upper bound for all network structures, all initial
values of p and all λi (in particular λi → 0). Expression (15) can be further simplified to
pmax < gˆ(pi;αi)| ∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
| ∀ i ∈ N and ∀ pi ∈ [0, p
max], which delivers Assumption 1. It then follows
from the contraction mapping theorem that Φ(·) has a unique steady state to which the
system converges globally.
Proof of Proposition 3 - Network Structure and Steady State
First note that we can summarize the updating process from period t to t + 1 of the model
with leader in the following matrix form pt+1+ = X(p
t)pt+, where pt+ is a 2 + n vector of
identities constructed by adding the host society and the leader to pt. The updating matrix
is given by:
X(pt) =

1 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 0 · · · 0
Gˆ(pt) 1 [I− Gˆ(pt)]Λ 1
[
I− Gˆ(pt)
]
[I−Λ] Γ
 ≡
 I 0
C(pt) D(pt)

C(pt) is then defined as a n×2 matrix describing the interaction of group members with
the host society and the leader, and D(pt) as a n×n matrix that reflects interaction of group
members among each other.
Now, consider X(t) which provides the t-th iteration with multiplication from the left
of X(ps) for a sequence of ps from s = 0 to t. This can be partitioned into
X(t) =
t∏
s=0
(X(ps)) =
 I 0
C(t) D(t)

where C(t) = D(pt)C(t− 1) + C(pt) and D(t) = ∏ts=0 (D(ps)). We consider the limits
of C(t) and D(t) as t → ∞. Following a similar logic as in the previous proofs, we can
show that limt→∞D(t) = 0. This implies that p is a convex combination of pS and pL only,
35
with the respective weights determined by limt→∞C(t) ≡ C. The limit can be expressed
as C = [I−D(p)]−1 C(p). Then, p = [I−D(p)]−1 C(p)[·,2]pL, where C(p)[·,2] refers to the
second column of the matrix C(p). Substituting the definitions of matrices D(p) and C(p)
from above yields p =
{
I− (I−Λ)
[
I− Gˆ(p)
]
Γ
}−1
[I− Gˆ(p)]Λ1pL as required.
Proof of Proposition 5: Identity Spread for Different Types
The results follow from the implicit function theorem applied to the system of equations
describing the steady state (equations (9) and (10)). We define
FA(pA, pB; γ, pL) ≡ [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] {λpL + (1− λ) [γpA + (1− γ) pB]} − pA = 0
FB(pA, pB; γ, pL) ≡ [1− gˆ(pB;αB)] {λpL + (1− λ) [γpB + (1− γ) pA]} − pB = 0.
By the implicit function theorem the effect of a change in the parameter γ on i’s identity is
given by ∂pi∂γ =
−|Ji(γ)|
|J | , where J is the Jacobian of F with respect to endogenous variables
and Ji(γ) is the same matrix with column i replaced by the vector of partial derivatives with
respect to parameter γ. We compute |J | and |Ji(γ)| from the partial derivatives givenby:
∂Fi
∂pi
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ)γ −
∂gˆ(pi;αi)
∂pi
{
λpL + (1− λ)
[
γpi + (1− γ) pj
]}− 1 < 0 (16)
∂Fi
∂pj
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ)(1− γ) > 0 (17)
∂Fi
∂γ
= [1− gˆ(pi;αi)] (1− λ)
(
pi − pj
)
. (18)
Equation (16) can be signed using Assumption 1. The sign of equation (17) follows directly
from gˆ(pi;αi) ∈ (0, 1). Equation (18) adopts the sign of (pi − pj) which is negative for ∂FA∂γ .
The determinant of the Jacobian |J | is then given by |J | = ∂FA∂pA
∂FB
∂pB
− ∂FA∂pB
∂FB
∂pA
> 0. The
inequality follows by recognizing that Assumption 1 implies that |∂Fi∂pi | > |
∂Fi
∂pj
| for A and B.
We then proceed to make two observations which allow us to analyze the impact of γ on
identity.
1. In the model with two-types, ifαA > αB then pA < pB for all levels of inter-connection γ between
types. As |J | > 0, the Jacobian is non-singular for all pA, pB ∈ [0, pmax]. By the implicit
function theorem the mapping of parameters to long run identities pA and pB is therefore
continuously differentiable over the domain of γ. Differentiability implies continuity.
Proceed by contradiction. Define pB ≡ pA + ∆ and suppose there exists γˆ such that
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pB ≤ pA and thus ∆ ≤ 0. If γ = 1, then ∆ > 0. Given continuity of the implicit func-
tion it follows by the intermediate value theorem that there must exist γ˜ ∈ [γˆ, 1] such
that ∆ = 0 or equivalently pA = pB = p˜. By the definition of the steady state this im-
plies [1− gˆ(p˜;αA)] {λpL + (1− λ) p˜} = [1− gˆ(p˜;αB)] {λpL + (1− λ) p˜}. This is equivalent
to gˆ(p˜;αA) = gˆ(p˜;αB), where the final line contradicts the assumption that αA > αB .
2. |pA − pB| decreases in γ. The determinant of the modified Jacobian JA(γ) can be signed as
follows:
|JA(γ)| = ∂FA
∂γ
∂FB
∂pB
− ∂FA
∂pB
∂FB
∂γ
= [1− gˆ(pA;αA)] (1− λ) (pA − pB)
×
{
[1− gˆ(pB;αB)] (1− λ)−
∂gˆ(pB;αB)
∂pB
{λpL + (1− λ) [γpB + (1− γ) pA]} − 1
}
> 0
The final inequality is due to the multiplication of two negative components: The first part
has the sign of pA − pB , which is negative as αA > αB . The second part is negative by
Assumption 1, applied here to pB .
Reassembling, we can now sign the effect of γ on pA as
∂pA
∂γ =
−|JA(γ)|
|J | < 0. The proof that
∂pB
∂γ =
−|JB(γ)|
|J | > 0 works along the same lines and is omitted for brevity.
Proof of Proposition 6: Leader Decision
We first establish that p(pL) is an increasing function in pL. To see this recall equation
(11), p = [1− gˆ(p;α)] {λpL + (1− λ) p}. Differentiating with respect to pL yields ∂p∂pL =
λ(1−gˆ(p;α))
1+
∂gˆ(p;α)
∂p
(λpL+(1−λ)p)−(1−λ)(1−gˆ(p;α))
, which is strictly positive under Assumption 1. This
strictly increasing relationship between pL and p allows us to study the leader problem
from the perspective of p.
To simplify notation, we define the steady state income of group members as w ≡
αfˆ(p;α). The leader’s payoff is then given by pi(p, w) and in case of an interior solution
the first order condition is
(
∂pi(p, w)
∂p
+
∂pi(p, w)
∂w
∂w
∂p
)
∂p
∂pL
= 0
We have an interior global maximum if ∂
2fˆ(p;α)
∂p2
< 0 which is equivalent to the condition
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that f ′′′
(
H
)
< 0. To see this, consider the second order equation:
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ 2
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
∂w
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
∂pi(p, w)
∂w
∂2w
∂p2
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
(
∂w
∂p
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
.
The second order condition is negative whenever: ∂pi(p,w)∂w
∂2w
∂p2
< 0, where ∂pi(p,w)∂w >0 and
∂2w
∂p2
= α
∂2fˆ(p, α)
∂p2
= α
(
c21
α2f ′′(H)
){
1− f ′ (H) f ′′′ (H)[
f ′′
(
H
)]2
}
.
Thus, a sufficient condition for an interior solution that maximizes leader’s payoff is ∂
2fˆ(p;α)
∂p2
<
0 which is implied by f ′′′
(
H
)
< 0. If this condition is violated the interior solution might be
a minimum and the leader will select an extreme solution at either pL = pmax or pL = 0.45
Proof of Proposition 8: Comparative Statics α
Effect on pL In case of the interior solution being a maximum, we consider the effect of an
increase of α on pL, or rather p, as the leader can set directly the group member identity he
prefers. We define F ≡
(
∂pi(p,w)
∂p +
∂pi(p,w)
∂w
∂w
∂p
)
= 0. From this we can calculate the effect of
α on p, ∂p∂α = −
∂F
∂α
∂F
∂p
. At an interior solution we have ∂F∂p < 0 and thus sign
(
∂p
∂α
)
= sign
(
∂F
∂α
)
,
where
∂F
∂α
=
(
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
∂w
∂p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂w
∂α
+
∂pi(p, w)
∂w︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂2w
∂p∂α
.
Thus, the sign of the derivative depends on ∂w∂α and
∂2w
∂p∂α . We know that
∂w
∂α = f(H) +
αf ′(H)∂H∂α > 0. Further,
∂2w
∂p∂α = f
′(H)∂H∂p +αf
′′(H)∂H∂p
∂H
∂α +αf
′(H) ∂
2H
∂p∂α ,where
∂H
∂p =
c1
αf ′′(H) ,
∂H
∂α = − f
′(H)
αf ′′(H) , and
∂2H
∂p∂α = − c1α2f ′′(H)
(
1− f
′(H)f ′′′(H)
[f ′′(H)]
2
)
. Then,
∂2w
∂p∂α
= −c1
α
f ′(H)
f ′′(H)
(
1− f
′ (H) f ′′′ (H)[
f ′′
(
H
)]2
)
> 0,
45 If identity and earnings are strategic substitutes, then it is no longer sufficient that f ′′′
(
H
)
< 0. However,
the key result of leaders choosing either between complete cultural differentiation, intermediate differentiation
or full integration remains unchanged.
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which implies that sign
(
∂F
∂α
)
= sign
(
∂p
∂α
)
> 0 as we have assumed that
(
1− f
′(H)f ′′′(H)
[f ′′(H)]
2
)
>
0 in order to ensure that the interior solution is a maximum. Thus, an increase in α leads to
a higher pL.
Effect on H The effect of an increase of α on H is given by dHdα =
1
αf ′′(H)
(
c1
dp
dα − f ′(H)
)
,
which implies that sign
(
dH
dα
)
= −sign
(
c1
dp
dα − f ′(H)
)
, with
c1
dp
dα
− f ′(H) = −f ′(H)∂
2pi(p, w)
∂p2
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
(
−c1f(H)− f ′(H)∂w
∂p
)
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
∂w
∂p
(−c1f(H)) . (19)
The sign of equation (19) is ambiguous without further restrictions.
Effect on w We show that an increase in α leads to higher income. The effect of α on w is
given by ∂w∂α = f(H) +
f ′(H)
f ′′(H)
(
−c1
∂F
∂α
∂F
∂p
− f ′(H)
)
> 0, which is equivalent to
f(H)f ′′(H)
f ′(H)
∂F
∂p
> c1
∂F
∂α
+ f ′(H)
∂F
∂p
. (20)
We know from equation (19) that the term on the right can be rewritten as
c1
∂F
∂α
+ f ′
∂F
∂p
= f ′(H)
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p2
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
(
c1f(H) + f
′(H)
∂w
∂p
)
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
∂w
∂p
(
c1f(H)
)
.
Equation (20) can then be rewritten as
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p2
(
f(H)f ′′(H)
f ′(H)
− f ′(H)
)
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
(
2
f(H)f ′′(H)
f ′(H)
∂w
∂p
− c1f ′(H)− f ′(H)∂w
∂p
)
+
∂pi(p, w)
∂w
∂2w
∂p2
f(H)f ′′(H)
f ′(H)
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
∂w
∂p
(
f(H)f ′′(H)
f ′(H)
∂w
∂p
− c1f(H)
)
> 0.
Taking into account that ∂w∂p =
c1f ′(H)
f ′′(H) < 0 and the signs of the derivatives which have been
established before, we find that ∂w∂α > 0.
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Proof of Corollary 8.1: Increase in Skill Investment
We show that an increase in α leads to an increase in skill investment for the business leader.
By equation (19):
sign
(
dH
dα
)
=sign
(
− f ′(H)∂
2pi(p, w)
∂p2
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
(
−c1f(H)− f ′(H)∂w
∂p
)
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
∂w
∂p
(−c1f(H)) ).
The derivatives are given by ∂
2pi(p,w)
∂p2
= −β(1 − β)pβ−2w1−β , ∂2pi(p,w)∂p∂w = β(1 − β)pβ−1w−β
and ∂
2pi(p,w)
∂w2
= −β(1 − β)pβw−β−1. We can then write the statement of the corollary as
f ′(H)p−1w +
(
−c1f(H)− f ′(H)∂w∂p
)
+ pw−1c1f(H)∂w∂p > 0 which after some algebra and
substituting for the definition of w simplifies to f ′(H)αp =
c0
p + c1 > c1. This establishes the
result.
Proof of Proposition 9: Effect of a Lump Sum Transfer
This proof follows along the lines of the Proof of Proposition 8, with the only change being
the lump sum transfer added to income from skills and thus w = αf(H∗) + z. The sign of a
change in the transfer z is given by sign
(
∂p
∂z
)
= sign
(
∂F
∂z
)
, where
∂F
∂z
=
(
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
∂w
∂p
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
∂w
∂z
+
∂pi(p, w)
∂w︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
∂2w
∂p∂z
We know that ∂w∂z =
∂(αfˆ(p;α)+z)
∂z = 1 and
∂2w
∂p∂z = 0 as
∂w
∂p is independent of z. This implies
that ∂F∂z ≥ 0 and thus ∂p∂z ≥ 0. Then, ∂H
∗
∂z =
c1
αf ′′(H∗)
∂p
∂z ≤ 0. The effect of the transfer on
wages is then given by ∂w∂z = αf
′ (H∗) ∂H
∗
∂z +1 =
∂p
∂z
∂w
∂p +1 = −
∂F
∂z
∂F
∂p
∂w
∂p +1.Wages are positive
if 1 >
∂F
∂z
∂F
∂p
∂w
∂p , which is equivalent to
∂F
∂z
∂w
∂p >
∂F
∂p . This is equivalent to
(
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
∂w
∂p
)
∂w
∂p
>
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+ 2
∂2pi(p, w)
∂p∂w
∂w
∂p︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+
∂pi(p, w)
∂w
∂2w
∂p2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂2pi(p, w)
∂w2
(
∂w
∂p
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
This simplifies to 0 > ∂
2pi(p,w)
∂p2
+ ∂
2pi(p,w)
∂p∂w
∂w
∂p +
∂pi(p,w)
∂w
∂2w
∂p2
, which using the results from above
is true and thus establishes the result.
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Proof of Proposition 11: Comparative Statics γ
We define YA ≡
(
∂pi(pA,wA)
∂pA
+ ∂pi(pA,wA)∂wA
∂wA
∂pA
)
, and YB ≡
(
∂pi(pB ,wB)
∂pB
+ ∂pi(pB ,wB)∂wB
∂wB
∂pB
)
,which
allows us to rewrite equation (13) as FAB ≡ YA ∂pA∂pL +YB
∂pB
∂pL
= 0. Then the effect of a change
in γ on pL is given by dpLdγ = −
dFAB
dγ
dFAB
dpL
Again, as dFABdpL < 0, sign
(
dpL
dγ
)
= sign
(
dFAB
dγ
)
.
dFAB
dγ
=
∂YA
∂pA
∂pA
∂γ
∂pA
∂pL
+
∂YB
∂pB
∂pB
∂γ
∂pB
∂pL︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Part 1
+YA
∂2pA
∂pL∂γ
+ YB
∂2pB
∂pL∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Part 2
We then show in the Online Appendix that Part 1 is negative if ∂
3pi(p,αfˆ(p;α))
∂p3
≤ 0. Part 2 is
also negative, see the Online Appendix. Based on this we can then calculate the effect of a
change in γ on pA and pB , taking into account that we know how pL adjusts:
∂pA
∂γ
= − 1|J |
(
−λ∂pL
∂γ
+ (pB − pA)(1− λ)
)
(XB − (1− λ)(1− γ) (1− gˆ(pB;αB))) < 0
∂pB
∂γ
= − 1|J |
(
−λ∂pL
∂γ
− (pB − pA)(1− λ)
)
(XA − (1− λ)(1− γ) (1− gˆ(pA;αA))) R 0
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